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ESSAY
DECONSTRUCTING EQUITY: PUBLIC OWNERSHIP,
AGENCY COSTS, AND COMPLETE CAPITAL MARKETS
Ronald j Gilson*
Charles K. Whitehead**
The traditionallaw and finance focus on agency costs presumes that
the premise that diversified public shareholders are the cheapest risk bearers is
immutable. In this Essay, we raise the possibility that changes in the capital
markets have called this premise into question, drawn into sharp reliefby the
recent private equity wave in which the size and range of public companies
being taken private expanded signficantly. In brief, we argue that private
owners, in increasingly complete markets, can transfer risk in discrete slices
to counterpartieswho, in turn, can manage or otherwise diversify away those
risks they choose to forego, arguably becoming a lower cost substitutefor traditional risk capital.
If diversified shareholders are no longer the cheapest risk bearers, then
the associated agency costs may now be voluntary; and ifrisk management
can substitutefor risk capitalwithout requiringa transfer of ownership, then
why go public at all? Do more complete capital markets herald (once again)
the eclipse of the public corporation? We offer some preliminary responses,
suggesting that the line between public and privatefirms may begin to blur
as the balance between agency costs and the benefits of public ownership shift
toward a new equilibrium.
INTRODUCTION

Public shareholders and agency costs are two sides of the same coin.
If companies need residual risk capital, and if public investors who can
diversify their shareholdings are the cheapest risk bearers,' then we get
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School; Marc and
Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School; and Fellow, European
Corporate Governance Institute.
** Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. The authors
appreciate the thoughtful comments and contributions of Robert Bone, Rob Daines, Luca
Enriques, Alphonse Fletcher, Jr., Stephen Fraidin, Victor Goldberg, Darian Ibrahim,
Michael Klausner, Reinier Kraakman, Daniel Neff, Karl Okamoto, Larry Ribstein, Alan
Schwartz, David Walker, and participants in the Boston University School of Law Faculty
Workshop, the Columbia Law School Transactional Studies Roundtable, the Cornell Law
School Faculty Workshop, the University of Florence Law School Workshop, and the Paolo
Fresco Lecture at the University of Genoa Law School. Professor Whitehead also thanks
Meghan Bailey and Lauren O'Leary for their valuable research assistance. The usual
disclaimers apply.
1. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual
Claims, 26J.L. & Econ. 327, 329 (1983) ("Common stock allows residual risk to be spread
across many residual claimants who individually choose the extent to which they bear risk
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agency costs. 2 The capital provided by these cheap risk bearers necessarily is managed by someone else, whose interests are not perfectly aligned
with those of investors, a divergence famously framed by Adolph Berle
and Gardiner Means a little over seventy-five years ago. 3 As a result, for at
least the last thirty years, modern corporate governance scholarship has
focused on finding a means to bridge the agency gap between diversified
risk bearers and managers. 4 Proxy fights, hostile takeovers, independent
directors, institutional investors, and, most recently, hedge
funds and activist shareholders have all held the mantle of favored
agency-cost-reducer at one time or another.
The traditional law and finance focus on agency costs presumes,
without acknowledgment, that the agency cost framework's bedrock premise-that diversified shareholders are the cheapest risk bearers-is immutable. 5 In this Essay, we confront the possibility that the continued
development of increasingly complete capital markets, in which working
capital can be separated from risk capital6 and discrete slices of risk can
be separately transferred, pooled, and shared among market participants,
has called the premise into question. 7 From this perspective, the traditional need for residual shareholders, whose risk exposure spanned the
and who can diversify across organizations offering such claims."). The literature on the
reduction of risk through diversification is vast and resulted in the award of a Nobel Prize
in Economic Sciences to Harry Markowitz, whose work served as a foundation for that of
Merton Miller and William Sharpe, who shared the 1990 prize with Markowitz. There is no
need here, for our purposes, to track this familiar development beyond the simple
recognition that by holding a relatively small number of stocks an investor can substantially
reduce the impact of unsystematic risk on the value of her portfolio. See Richard A.
Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 160-62 (8th
ed. 2006).
2. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26J.L. & Econ. 301, 304 (1983) [hereinafter Fama &Jensen, Separation] (defining agency
costs as "includ[ing] the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts
among agents with conflicting interests").
3. Adolph A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 119-25 (1932).
4. We mark this period as beginning with Jensen and Meckling's seminal 1976 article.
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
5. Jensen and Meckling left open the possibility of a change in the tradeoffs between
agency costs and gains resulting from new equity investment. See infra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text. This qualification, however, was largely ignored in the literature that
followed.
6. Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and Economic Performance, J. Applied
Corp. Fin., Winter 1992, at 12, 12 [hereinafter Merton, Financial Innovation] (noting that
working capital, used to finance firm projects, can now be separated from risk capital that
bears risks of those projects).
7. The theoretical framework for the implications of complete capital markets is set
out in Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing 121-43 (3d prtg. 1976);
KennethJ. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing, 31 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 91, 91-96 (1964); and Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an
Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 Econometrica 265, 265-66 (1954).
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marketplace, reflected the absence of low-cost means to transfer-and
market participants who could be paid to bear-only a portion of that
risk. In complete capital markets, private owners can purchase risk bearing and liquidity in discrete slices. And if risk management and liquidity
are available by the slice-if, for example, the owners of a private company can separate and transfer the risk of commodity prices, or catastrophic acts of nature, or even a business cycle, rather than transfer bundled risk through the issuance of common stock-then much of what has
constituted the corporate governance debate may require reexamination.
We write at a remarkable moment in the history of the capital markets. Over the last few years, there has been a large movement of public
companies into private ownership through leveraged acquisitions by private equity firms. 8 This recalls, of course, Michael Jensen's then premature announcement in the late 1980s, in the face of an earlier private
equity wave, of the "eclipse of the public corporation" by a more efficient
organization form: the leveraged buyout (LBO) association. 9 At that
time, Alfred Rappaport argued that the concept of the LBO was self-limiting, and in particular, that most public firms failed to meet the criteria
necessary to go private-strong and predictable cash flows, readily saleable assets or businesses, strong market positions or brands, status as a lowcost producer, and limited sensitivity to cyclical swings. 10 Now, some
eighteen years after the Jensen-Rappaport debate, as the size and range
of public companies being taken private has expanded dramatically, 1 I the
8. Private equity firms and management announced over $700 billion in transactions
in 2006, raising over $400 billion in new investments during the same period. New
investments in 2007 are projected to top $500 billion. Miles Weiss & Brett Cole, Silver
Lake to Raise $10 Billion for Technology Fund, Bloomberg.com, Feb. 6, 2007, at http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=AVVXqOCw9pOw&refer=home
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review). In the United States alone, private equity firms in 2006
bought 654 companies for a total of $375 billion, eighteen times the level of acquisitions in
2003. RobertJ. Samuelson, The Private Equity Boom, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 2007, at A19.
Many of these companies remain private. The number of privately held U.S. businesses
with at least $1 billion in revenues increased by over eleven percent from 305 to 339
companies between 2004 and 2005, and by over sixteen percent to 394 companies between
2005 and 2006. Shlomo Reifman, Buyout Mania, Forbes, Nov. 27, 2006, at 183; Shlomo
Reifman & Samantha N. Wong, Who Needs Sarbox?, Forbes, Nov. 28, 2005, at 212.
9. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation 1-2 (1997) (unpublished
revision, originally published as Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=146149
[hereinafter Jensen,
Eclipse].
10. Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96, 97-98.
11. See Thomas Boulton, Kenneth Lehn & Steven Segal, The Rise of the U.S. Private
Equity Market, in New Financial Instruments and Institutions: Opportunities and Policy
Challenges 141, 142, 149-51 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (finding that
number and market value of companies going private, and industry distribution of those
companies, has increased over time); Diana Farrell et al., McKinsey & Co., The New Power
Brokers: How Oil, Asia, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity Are Shaping Global Capital
Markets 133 (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/TheNew_
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capital market phenomena that concern us here again raise questions
regarding the future of the public corporation and corporate governance
in stark terms. Those questions arise notwithstanding the turmoil in the
debt market, which appeared during the summer of 2007,12 raising concerns over the capacity of private equity buyers to finance current as well
as future private equity deals.1 3 We do not mean to downplay the extent
of the uncertainty in the debt market or the ability of buyers and lenders4
to use those events to renegotiate the terms of pending transactions.'
Our timeframe here, however, is much longer than the recent private
equity wave or the credit market uncertainty that is slowing it down. Our

PowerBrokers/index.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting evidence that
"private equity firms have broadened the range of companies they are prepared to buy,
going after new industries and companies with new profiles"); Int'l Monetary Fund, Global
Financial Stability Report 12 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/
FT/GFSR/2O07/01/index.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that deal
sizes in recent private equity wave are bigger than LBO wave of 1980s, and "few firms are
now thought to be too large to be the target of a takeover"); Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The
Private Equity Boom: Causes and Policy Issues, Fin. Market Trends, June 2007, at 59, 80
(observing that LBOs traditionally favored industries with stable cash flows but that current
deals "are spreading to industries such as airlines that are inherently more cyclical and
exposed to risk factors"); see also infra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
12. In late June 2007, concerns arose that uncertain conditions in the market for
collaterized debt obligations (CDO) of subprime mortgage debt could spread to the CDO
market for corporate debt that funds going private transactions, resulting in increased
interest rates that would slow the phenomena we discuss in the text. Saskia Scholtes &
Gillian Tett, Does It All Add Up?, Fin. Times, June 28, 2007, at 11. Conditions worsened as
the summer progressed, as uncertainty concerning the extent of the subprime lending
problem and its relation to the other segments of the credit market resulted in reduced
liquidity generally, leading a number of central banks to inject funds into the market to
increase liquidity. See, e,g., Norma Cohen et al., Central Banks Seek to Unblock Markets,
Fin. Times, Aug. 13, 2007, at 1 (describing central bank efforts to intervene in global
money markets).
13. See, e.g., James Politi & Francesco Guerrera, Not Dancing Anymore: How the
Music Stopped for Buy-out Buccaneers, Fin. Times, Aug. 14, 2007, at 7 (describing
potential impact on private equity firms of increased financing costs); Henny Sender,
Leveraged Buyout Remorse? Costs Throw Deals in Doubt, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at C1
(describing how private equity buyers were seeking to back out of pending LBO
transactions due to increased financing costs).
14. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera &James Politi, Home Depot to Cut Sale Terms, Fin.
Times, Aug. 10, 2007, at 11 (describing "the first time since the start of the private equity
boom three years ago" that U.S. private equity firm sought to renegotiate deal terms);
Politi & Guerrera, supra note 13, at 7 (noting decision to postpone sale of Cadbury
Schweppes's U.S. drinks business). Not all attempts at renegotiation have been smooth, as
evidenced by Sallie Mae's lawsuit against private equity investors, led byJ.C. Flowers, who
allegedly sought to use market turmoil as a means to renegotiate buyout terms. See Ben
White, Sallie Mae Files Lawsuit on Break-up Fee in Row over Deal Terms, Fin. Times, Oct.
10, 2007, at 16 (describing Sallie Mae's claim that private equity consortium asserted
material adverse change as result of "liquidity crunch" making it more expensive to finance
buyout).
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driven by economic
goal is to highlight what we argue is a secular1trend,
5
perturbations.
current
survive
will
that
forces
Our argument proceeds along the following lines. First, we review
changes in the capital markets that have led to new risk management
techniques and instruments, including sophisticated derivatives and insurance contracts, which enable firms and private owners to transfer risk
in discrete slices as opposed to a broad transfer of risk to purchasers of
common stock. 16 Risk counterparties can, in turn, diversify or transfer
risks they choose to forego, arguably becoming a lower cost substitute for
the broad spectrum of risk bearing traditionally assumed by public shareholders (which we sometimes refer to as "broadband" risk).
Second, we suggest a number of ways in which focused risk management at the firm level may be more efficient than broadband risk bearing
by diversified shareholders. The potential to increase firm value may fuel
the "self-interested maximizing behavior" of managers that Jensen and
Meckling view as the engine for developing new and increasingly efficient
means to manage and transfer risk. 17 Advances in risk management may,
consequently, result in decreased demand for broadband risk bearingin our terms, a deconstruction of equity.
Finally, we build on Myron Scholes's work and argue that if risk management can begin to substitute for equity, with firms relying instead on
debt to fund working capital, then the traditional model's reliance on
public equity, and the corresponding agency costs, may increasingly become optional.' 8 We then again confront the possibility (using Michael
Jensen's evocative phrase) of the eclipse of the public corporation, but
with an important difference: More complete capital markets may now
make the governance structure anticipated by Jensen available to (and
sustainable by) a much wider range of companies. As noted earlier, we
are not unmindful that the speed by which this broader availability is
15. LBOs will continue to play an important role in the financial markets, even in the
next few years. Farrell et al., supra note 11, at 128, 136-37. Although assets under
management are difficult to measure, McKinsey & Company estimates that private equity
assets will continue to grow, from $0.7 trillion in 2006 to $1.4 trillion by 2012. Id. at 15,
127-28, 137. The potential for increase in private equity-owned companies is significanttoday their value is only 5.1% of the value of companies listed on U.S. stock markets and
3.0% of companies listed in Europe. Id. at 15, 135.
16. As Myron Scholes has described, "Equity is a risk-management device. It is an 'allpurpose' risk cushion." Myron S. Scholes, Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment, 88 Am.
Econ. Rev. 350, 366 (1998) [hereinafter Scholes, Derivatives].
17. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 356.
18. Myron Scholes first raised this possibility in 1995, positing that firms would
substitute less costly derivative instruments for equity capital, increasing their reliance on
internal funds and debt financing. Firms could, as a result, consider the relative
advantages and disadvantages of relying on public equity in deciding whether or not to
incur the incremental costs of going public. See Myron S. Scholes, The Future of Futures,
in Risk Management: Problems & Solutions 349, 362-65 (William H. Beaver & George
Parker eds., 1995) [hereinafter Scholes, Futures]; see also Scholes, Derivatives, supra note
16, at 364-68 (reaffirming and expanding upon prediction made in 1995).
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taken up will depend in the short- and medium-term on conditions in the
capital markets, including the availability and cost of debt. Our point is
not to predict the precise shape of the take-up curve, but rather its trend
line uncomplicated by the effect of short-term conditions.' 9
If we are entering an era when risk can be transferred by the slice
without a corresponding transfer of ownership, then private corporation
owners may begin to ask, "Why go public at all?" The real benefits of
broad, public ownership may, on balance, still argue in favor of going (or
remaining) public. 20 Nevertheless, as firms increasingly transfer risk to
the marketplace in slices, equity will become subject to greater unsystematic (and less systematic) risk consistent with primary ownership by
management, over time resulting in the elimination of the Berle and
Means separation. 2 1 Common stock then becomes, in effect, an incentive
contract that aligns the interests of owner-managers and the corporation.
The result, we predict, is that public ownership will continue to be meaningful for many firms but that the traditional balance between agency
costs and the benefits of raising equity from diversified investors may begin to shift. A new equilibrium may emerge as firms assess their ability to
manage risk relative to the marketplace, retaining those risks where they
22
are at a competitive advantage and transferring the rest.
We are not alone in recognizing that the rapid evolution of the capital markets has important implications for our corporate governance institutions. Jeffrey Gordon has described how increasing market completeness over the last fifty years has improved the informational content
of share prices and thereby made feasible a governance structure characterized by independent directors whose role is to monitor, rather than to
advise, managers. 23 Others have identified the role of increasingly complete capital markets in permitting shareholders to decouple economic
ownership from voting rights, challenging a central precept of the public
corporation that assigns voting rights to common shareholders because
they bear residual risk. 24 This decoupling takes place in the secondary
markets, through stock lending, equity swaps, derivatives, and other trading strategies, where investors can synthetically unbundle voting and own19. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 120-130 and accompanying text.
21. For a useful summary of the relationship between systematic and unsystematic
risk, and between risk and ownership, see Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 1, at 160-63.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 131 and 145.
23. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1541-63
(2007).
24. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, 823, 828-35 (2006); Marcel Kahan
& Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1070-77 (2007); Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation in Corporate Law,
31 J. Corp. L. 799, 809-11 (2006).
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ership without action by the corporation. 2 5 However, to the extent that
increasingly complete capital markets may alter a principal characteristic
26
of equity itself, a more organic change may be taking place.
To ground some of our speculations, we offer the example of
Agricore United (AU), a publicly traded corporation listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange since 1993, as evidence of the kind of risk management that is possible. 2 7 The potential impact of increasingly complete
capital markets on corporate governance and ownership structure is
driven by these possibilities.
AU provides handling and delivery services to the grain farmers of
western Canada. 28 Historically, its main source of unmanaged risk was
related to weather-grain crops in western Canada are affected by regional temperature and precipitation duringJune andJuly, in turn affecting seasonal yields, the amount of grain transported through AU, and
ultimately, AU's profitability. 29 Weather variation, in fact, resulted in
wide and unpredictable swings in AU's annual profits, 30 forcing AU to

25. Hu & Black, supra note 24, at 828-35.
26. Larry Ribstein has usefully catalogued the organizational characteristics that have
developed to support this change. Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 7-45
(Ill. Law & Econ. Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. LE07-026, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1003790 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). While our focus in the text is on the separation of ownership and
management within the traditional Berle and Means construct of diversified public
shareholdings, the phenomenon of more complete capital markets and the resulting
deconstruction of equity is equally applicable to markets characterized by controlling
shareholders. See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1642, 1645-73 (2006)
(describing national capital markets dominated by public companies with controlling
shareholders). Controlling shareholders who seek outside equity will still select the most
efficient risk bearer when the company goes public--diversified (minority) shareholders,
unless more complete capital markets offer a more efficient alternative. As in corporations
with widely distributed shareholdings, agency costs are the other side of the traditional
nisk-bearing coin, although in controlling shareholder systems it appears as private benefits
of control. Id. at 1652-61.
27. See generally Agricore United, at http://www.agricoreunited.com/cgi-bin/bvsm/
AU2/index.jsp?BV UseBVCookie=yes&auGateway=l
(last modified July 18, 2006)
(providing corporate information, mission, and history).
28. Id.
29. Scott Harrington & Greg Niehaus, United Grain Growers: Enterprise Risk
Management and Weather Risk, 6 Risk Mgmt. & Ins. Rev. 193, 200-04 (2003) (presenting
case study using experience of United Grain Growers Ltd. (UGG) to illustrate enterprise
risk management). UGG merged with Agricore Cooperative Ltd. in 2001 to form AU.
Agricore United, Corporate History, at http://www.agricoreunited.com/cgi-bin/bvsm/
AU2/AboutUs/Corporatelnfo/CorporateProfile/index.jsp?BV_UseBVCookie=yes
(last
modified June 13, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
30. Russ Banham, Whatever the Weather: How United Grain Growers Tamed Mother
Nature in Completing the Deal of the Decade, CFO Mag., June 2000, at 117, 117
[hereinafter Banham, Whatever the Weather] (describing volatility of up to about twenty
percent of revenues of UGG, one of AU's predecessor companies).
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borrow funds in order to make needed capital investments and to rely on
3
equity capital as a cushion against unexpected drops in revenue. '
AU decided to remove the direct effects of weather on its profits by
transferring its weather exposure outside the firm. It did so by entering
into an insurance contract with Swiss Re, the world's largest reinsurer and
a leading expert in capital and risk management.3 2 Under the terms of
that contract, Swiss Re agreed to pay AU whenever actual industry-wide
grain production fell below average volumes over the prior five years
(subject to limits and deductibles). 3 The resulting insurance solution
was both over- and under-inclusive: over-inclusive because it extended
coverage to any reduction in grain volumes, not simply shortfalls resulting from weather, and could result in payments that were greater than
AU's actual losses; 3 4 and under-inclusive because actual losses might exceed payments received under the policy (collectively referred to as "basis
risk").35 The policy, however, had a direct impact on AU's capital structure-allowing it to increase its debt financing levels, separate a portion
of its working capital needs from its risk capital, substitute its new insur36
ance for existing equity, and lower its overall cost of capital.
31. Harrington & Niehaus, supra note 29, at 204-05.
32. The array of weather derivatives has continued to expand and, in addition to
customized over-the-counter contracts, weather-related risk can now be transferred
through a more liquid auction market. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
33. The dollar amount of the payment was based on the difference between the fiveyear average and actual industry grain volumes for the year, multiplied by a percentage
reflecting AU's market share and its average profit margin per ton of grain handled.
Harrington & Niehaus, supra note 29, at 212-13. AU was also able to integrate various
other coverages (for example, property and tort liability exposure) under the same
insurance policy, replacing individual deductibles and limits with aggregate levels that
allowed it to combine its weather exposure with AU's other risks and so reduce its
aggregate cost of insurance. Id. at 207, 213-16.
34. There were accounting limits on the extent to which payments could exceed
actual losses if the insurance contract was to qualify for "hedge accounting." Hedge
accounting permits the hedge and the hedged asset to be marked to market, so that losses
incurred by AU would be offset by gains on its insurance contract. To qualify, however,
there must be a close correlation between the insurance contract and any losses incurred
on AU's handling and delivery business. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on
Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312, 1358-59 (2001). The cost and complexity of those
standards has prompted their reconsideration, potentially making hedge accounting
available to a broader group of companies. See David Reilly, FASB Weighs Simplifying
Complex Accounting Rule, Wall St. J., May 10, 2007, at C2.
35. Insurance typically exposes a firm to limited basis risk due to the direct
relationship between the loss incurred and the payment made by the insurer. Yet a
contract based on AU's actual grain volumes would have exposed Swiss Re to moral hazard.
Risk factors other than weather, such as AU's decisions on pricing and service, might also
influence throughput volumes. If the resulting losses were borne by Swiss Re, then AU's
managers would have strong incentives to adjust their business strategy to maximize
returns to AU, potentially at Swiss Re's expense.
36. According to AU Chief Financial Officer Peter Cox: "'The minute we did this
deal, we were able to raise [our leverage ratio] to 52.5 percent [equivalent to an increase of
approximately $25 million in capital] without incurring additional risk to the company,
because the capital we previously set aside to cover volume-based losses was replaced by

HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 238 2008

2008]

DECONSTRUCTING EQUITY

As AU's experience illustrates, in today's capital markets, the more a
firm is able to identify and hedge its risk exposure, the less equity it may
need to support its operations.3 7 The ability to identify and transfer risk
outside the firm means that firms no longer must rely on equity capital as
a catch-all for residual risk, 38 and so the associated agency costs of equity
become increasingly optional. Derivatives, sophisticated insurance contracts, and other risk transfer instruments can begin to substitute for equity's traditional risk-bearing function, 39 with the result that a firm's decisions on risk management must increasingly become part of its decisions
40
on capital.
In Part I, we set the stage by developing the link between incomplete
capital markets and the traditional role of equity as a broadband risk
bearer-from Berle and Means toJensen and Meckling. Part II traces the
development of markets for discrete risk transfer-by the slice-and the
potential for risk management at the corporate level to increase firm
value. Part III presents the core of our argument: More complete capital
markets provide the potential to reduce equity to an incentive contract,
and thereby resurrect the alternative of remaining private. We then explore the recent private equity wave: Do more complete capital markets
mean that the predicted eclipse of the public corporation has finally
caught up with us? Our prediction is that going public will continue to
be meaningful for many firms, but that the equilibrium between agency
costs and the benefits of public ownership may begin to shift in the direcinsurance."' Banham, Whatever the Weather, supra note 30, at 120. The Swiss Re contract
was subsequently renewed, most recently through October 31, 2009, at reduced coverage
levels, in part reflecting the challenges to an insurer of managing weather-related risk
exposure. See Russ Banham, Fear Factor: Sarbanes-Oxley Offers One More Reason to
Tackle Enterprise Risk Management, CFO Mag., June 2003, at 65, 70 (noting that droughts
and changes in insurance market resulted in renewal of AU program with reduced
coverage); John Conley, An Integrated Program Revisited, Risk Mgmt., Dec. 2002, at 48, 48
(describing uncertainty but also optimism surrounding AU and Swiss Re's renewal
negotiations); see also Outsourcing Capital, Economist, Nov. 27, 1999, at 76 (noting
relatively higher cost of risk capital allocated by AU against unhedged earnings).
37. Christopher L. Culp, The Revolution in Corporate Risk Management: A Decade
of Innovations in Process and Products, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Winter 2002, at 8, 15
[hereinafter Culp, Revolution].
38. Scholes, Derivatives, supra note 16, at 366.
39. Ren6 M. Stulz, Rethinking Risk ManagementJ. Applied Corp. Fin., Fall 1996, at 8,
16.
40. See Christopher L. Culp, Contingent Capital: Integrating Corporate Financing
and Risk Management Decisions, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Spring 2002, at 46, 49-55
(describing different contingent capital facilities available to firms); Merton, Financial
Innovation, supra note 6, at 19 (predicting that financial innovation would result in risk
management becoming "an integral part" of corporate capital management); Prakash
Shimpi, Integrating Risk Management and Capital Management, J. Applied Corp. Fin.,
Winter 2002, at 27, 27 (describing relationship between capital and risk management);
Stulz, supra note 39, at 16-17 (illustrating interdependence between risk management and
capital structure). In fact, both capital and risk management decisions are often managed
by the same person, the treasurer. See Robert Cooper, Corporate Treasury and Cash
Management 11 (2004).
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tion of private ownership. Part IV concludes by identifying the part of the
story we do not address: By what means will former investors in public
equity be able to invest capital as the opportunity to invest in traditional
broadband risk-bearing instruments recedes?
I. INCOMPLETE CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF EQUITY

Our analysis builds on the observation that a basic premise of the
traditional model of the corporation-that diversified investors holding
common stock are the cheapest risk bearers, resulting in the separation
of ownership and management-is being called into question by advances in risk management and increasingly complete capital markets.
We argue that these changes warrant a reconsideration of the role of
common stock in corporate governance and the agency cost framework
that results from diversified shareholders as residual risk bearers.
A little over seventy-five years ago, Berle and Means identified the
growing independence of management in the public corporation. That
independence arose from the separation of ownership and control as
widely dispersed public shareholders effectively became passive providers
of equity capital with little or no control over corporate managers. 4' A
key to that thesis was the relationship between corporate structure and
the public capital markets, 42 no doubt triggered by their growth 43 over
two extended bull markets during the thirty years leading up to the Great
Depression. 44 As usually presented, the separation of ownership and control is the natural outcome of the specialization needed for the corporate
form to respond to increases in efficient scale and scope that resulted
from the development of a continent-wide market. 45 Public shareholders, with the ability to diversify away unsystematic risk, could specialize in
risk bearing; and professional managers, necessary to run organizations
of the new scale and scope, could specialize in management.
This focus on shareholders as broadband risk bearers resulted in
part from the dearth of alternative risk-bearing instruments. The capital
markets of the 1930s were relatively incomplete, with few financial instruments available to firms or investors beyond stocks, bonds, and bank
loans. 46 Insurance was limited to traditional products, such as life, prop41. See Berle & Means, supra note 3, at 5-9, 277-81.
42. See id. at 5-6, 289-99.
43. See id. at 5, 47-68.
44. See Robert Sobel, The Big Board: A History of the New York Stock Market 206-61
(1965); Gene Smiley, The Expansion of the New York Securities Market at the Turn of the
Century, 55 Bus. Hist. Rev. 75, 75-77 (1981).
45. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial
Capitalism 51-89 (1990) (explaining how changes in markets and technology underlie
growth of corporate managerial hierarchies); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand:
The Managerial Revolution in American Business 484-500 (1977) (describing growth of
professional managers in U.S. corporations).
46. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance 27 (1928)
(noting that markets were broadly divided into one of two categories: stocks or bonds).
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erty, and casualty coverage. 4 7 It would be another forty years before a
new wave of risk transfer instruments would be introduced, 48 and twenty
more years after that before the new risk management of the 1990s began
to fundamentally change how firms manage and transfer risk. 49 Consequently, while the Berle and Means framework recognized a basic relationship between corporate structure and the capital markets, it was premised on the underdeveloped markets of the period-presuming, as a
result, that a firm's shareholders would bear most of the residual eco50
nomic risk of managerial decisions.
More recent scholarship has deconstructed the corporation into a
"nexus of contracts," rejecting a characterization of the shareholder as
"owner" in favor of one in which the corporation is an equilibrium
among actors, including shareholders, creditors, and managers, who bargain within a complex set of relationships with the corporate entity at the
center.5 1 In the contractarian framing, investors rely on the liquidity of
the public markets to inexpensively manage risk by diversifying their
Famed New York financier Russell Sage is credited with introducing puts and calls to the
U.S. markets in the mid-1800s, although his intention appears to have been to facilitate
speculative trading on limited capital and to circumvent the New York usury laws. Stephen
A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield &JeffreyJaffe, Corporate Finance 554 (5th ed. 1999).
For most, the financial markets comprised only the capital and loan markets, principally
made up of stocks, bonds, other traditional securities, and loans. See, e.g., Franklin Allen
& Anthony M. Santomero, The Theory of Financial Intermediation, 21 J. Banking & Fin.
1461, 1466-67 & tbl.1 (1997) (noting that, by 1930s, "traditional financial instruments had
been developed"); Smiley, supra note 44, at 80 tbl.3 (showing categories of earning assets
held by U.S. financial institutions from 1890 to 1908). At the time, those markets generally
did not extend to derivative instruments, in large part due to uncertainty over whether
they constituted illegal gaming contracts. See EdwardJ. Swan, Building the Global Market:
A 4000 Year History of Derivatives 251-54 (2000). Commodities were a notable exception.
The Chicago Board of Trade was established in 1848 and focused exclusively on
commodities contracts until the mid-1970s. The predecessor to the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange was established in 1898 to trade spot and futures contracts on eggs and dairy,
later expanding to include live cattle, feeder cattle, and pork bellies, and principally
remaining an agricultural marketplace until the early 1970s. Erik Banks, Exchange-Traded
Derivatives 119, 129 (2003).
47. See generally Christopher L. Culp, Structured Finance and Insurance 137-50
(2006) [hereinafter Culp, Structured Finance] (describing terms of traditional insurance
policies).
48. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 63-64, 73-79 and accompanying text.
50. Berle & Means, supra note 3, at 66-68.
51. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24J. Corp. L. 819, 820-23 (1999); Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 4, at 310-11. As one of us put it in 1981:
[The] description of shareholders as the "owners" of the corporation does not
suggest that [their] role.., flows, normatively, from their "ownership." It derives,
rather, from the need for those holding the residual interest in corporate profits
to have the means to displace management which performs poorly.... [T]his
position is based on matters other than a preconception of the rights associated
with "ownership"; indeed, if the statute did not provide for shareholders we
would have to invent them.
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holdings across a spectrum of firms; 5 2 and as residual claimants, shareholders bargain for ownership-type benefits, such as voting rights and fiduciary duties, to constrain the resulting agency costs.5 3 Diversified risk
bearing at the shareholder level was presumed to be the least costly
means to manage firm risk, even after taking account of those costs.5 4 At
the same time, while limiting residual claims to a small group of investors
might lower agency costs, the contractarian model predicted that doing
so would increase the costs of risk bearing and make concentrated owner55
ship less attractive.
So there we have a snapshot of the capital markets and corporate
governance in the mid-1970s, when Jensen and Meckling framed the
agency cost perspective on corporate structure and governance. Firms
financed by their managers eliminate the drag of agency costs associated
with public investment but sacrifice scale economies and new opportunities because of their own limited capital. For Jensen and Meckling, a
firm's scale and scope turned on the tradeoff between the gains from
expansion and the agency costs of debt and equity, the outcome of which
was conditioned on the instruments made available by the capital markets
and the existing techniques to constrain the agency costs of outside investment. 5 6 In the 1970s, this tradeoff still dictated the predominance of
57
equity held by diversified shareholders.
To be sure, the contractarian model left open the possibility that the
development of more complete capital markets, with new investment veRonald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 834 n.56 (1981).
52. See Fama &Jensen, Separation, supra note 2, at 302-03 (exploring residual claims
within model of organization as "nexus of contracts").
53. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 63-67 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26J.L. & Econ. 395, 401-06 (1983). Michael Klausner has recently argued
that emerging empirical evidence suggests that the contractual framework is more Coasian
than descriptive, with observed governance arrangements apparently driven by frictions
that result in arrangements that differ from what the framework predicts. See Michael
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. Corp. L.
779, 784-97 (2006).
54. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol.
Econ. 288, 289-92 (1980).
55. See Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 2, at 306.
56. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 319-23 (setting out model of optimal
scale of firm).
57. This analysis rests on the assumption that agency costs will increase in line with
growth in the scale and scope of a corporation's activities, holding other factors constant.
For example, the capacity of part-time independent directors to effectively monitor
management performance decreases with scale and scope, thereby increasing agency costs.
From this perspective, improved monitoring techniques expand a corporation's efficient
scale; the development of the junk bond market, for example, increased the scope of firms
whose performance could be monitored by the capital markets. Ronald J. Gilson,
Catalyzing Corporate Governance: The Evolution of the United States System in the 1980s
and 1990s, 24 Company & Sec. L.J. 143, 150-51 (2006) (Austl.).
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hicles, could change the tradeoff between the level of agency costs associated with public investment and gains from new investment. For example, Jensen and Meckling identified the conversion feature in convertible
bonds, a derivative of sorts, as a less costly means to reduce management
and shareholder incentives to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders (for example, by increasing riskiness) compared to other, more
costly means of control, such as ongoing monitoring in support of contractual covenants. 58 They also acknowledged the likelihood that new
corporate instruments would appear as the cost-benefit balance of creat59
ing and maintaining a market for them changed over time.
In the next Part, we describe important changes since the early 1970s
that have begun to erode the traditional model's reliance on public equity-in particular, the creation of new risk management tools and the
development of liquid markets to transfer risk. Financial innovation over
the last thirty years gave rise to an explosive growth in new instruments to
facilitate a private owner's purchase of risk bearing and liquidity in discrete slices. In short, these are not your father's capital markets.
II.

THE RISK REVOLUTION AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE

A. The Rise of Risk Management
For our purposes, "risk management" is a firm-level management discipline that identifies and measures risks that may affect firm value, assists
in choosing which risks to retain and which to transfer, and then implements and monitors strategies to execute those decisions. 60 Derivatives
are important risk transfer tools but comprise only one facet of risk
management. 6 1
Managing risk, of course, is nothing new. 6 2 For years, business people have managed risk by purchasing insurance, diversifying business
lines to reduce cash flow volatility, pursuing projects with greater cer58. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 353-54.
59. Id. at 356.
60. See Culp, Revolution, supra note 37, at 12-13 (describing components of risk
management process, including decision to transfer or retain risk).
61. There is a substantial body of literature, which we do not repeat here, that
describes and analyzes various kinds of risk management instruments. See, e.g., Robert E.
Whaley, Derivatives, in Handbook of the Economics of Finance 1131-99 (George M.
Constantinides, Milton Harris & Ren6 M. Stulz eds., 2003). For many, the term
"derivatives" is associated with the financial blow-ups of the 1990s. Managers may speculate
with derivatives in an effort to outperform their peers, as opposed to hedging business
risks. Scholes, Derivatives, supra note 16, at 366. For this article, we limit our analysis to
using risk transfer instruments to hedge, diversify, or transfer firm exposure to risk.
62. As Peter Bernstein has described, modern risk management is built on a
centuries-old history of understanding, measuring, and managing risk, commencing a little
over 350 years ago. Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk
3-6, 57-266 (1996); see also Swan, supra note 46, at 27-30 (describing how some basic
tools used to transfer risk find their roots in futures contracts that date from four millennia
ago).
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tainty but lower returns, and restricting leverage. However, corporate risk
management-which identifies, manages, and transfers risk on a consolidated, entity-wide basis 63-is a fairly recent development, having only
emerged as businesses have confronted a range of new risks and
uncertainties.

64

Those risks have differed in magnitude (if not always in kind) from
the risks faced by prior generations, ranging from a succession of financial system crises, to natural disasters, and even to acts of terrorism. The
end of Bretton Woods and the start of the OPEC oil embargo in 1973
subjected peacetime businesses to new, and potentially catastrophic, exchange rate and energy cost volatility. 6 5 Businesses that failed to take
those risks into account did so at their peril, often with disastrous consequences. 66 Traditional insurance policies offered little or no protection,
63. Corporate-wide risk management is commonly referred to today as "enterprise
risk management" (ERM). For a summary of the processes and challenges of
implementing ERM, see Brian W. Nocco & Ren6 Stulz, Enterprise Risk Management:
Theory and Practice, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Fall 2006, at 8, 14-20.
64. When the risk management function first appeared in the 1920s, it was usually
responsible for matching insurance to business hazards (such as fire and casualty),
managing costs, and not much more. See George E. Rogers, The Risk Manager and
Insurance Legislation, 30 J. Ins. 447, 447-48 (1963) (describing early function of risk
managers). Over the next thirty years, as policy costs increased, insurance buying grew to
become an important business function, with the corresponding emergence of industry
groups to coordinate that activity-the Insurance Division of the American Management
Association in 1931, the Insurance Buyers of New York (later, the Risk Research Institute)
in 1932, and the National Insurance Buyers Association (later, the Risk and Insurance
Management Society) in 1950. See Ralph H. Blanchard, Risk as a Special Subject of Study,
26 J. Ins. 8, 10 (1959) (describing growth of risk management as distinct area of study).
Risk management began to find its own feet as a new discipline in 1966 when the
Insurance Institute of America introduced its Associate in Risk Management (ARM)
professional degree program. H. Wayne Snider, Risk Management: A Retrospective View,
Risk Mgmt., Apr. 1991, at 47-49. Risk management in most public firms, however,
remained largely decentralized. Managing risk on a consolidated, entity-wide basis-where
a firm's overall risk portfolio, including operational, strategic, and business risks, is
managed centrally-has only emerged in the last ten years. Neil A. Doherty, Integrated
Risk Management: Techniques and Strategies for Managing Corporate Risk 10-13 (2000);
Culp, Revolution, supra note 37, at 14-15, 19; Paula L. Green, Risk Managers Cover
Enterprise Exposure, Global Fin., Jan. 2001, at 72.
65. Six years later, volatile short-term interest rates were temporarily added to the
growing list of new risks, in magnitude if not in kind, which companies began to face.
Interest rate volatility arose principally as a result of changes in Federal Reserve operating
procedures that were introduced in an effort to improve monetary controls. Timothy
Cook, Determinants of the Federal Funds Rate: 1979-1982, Econ. Rev. (Fed. Res. Bank of
Richmond, Richmond, Va.), Jan./Feb. 1989, at 3, 3.
66. Laker Airlines provides a compelling example with respect to foreign exchange
risk. Laker Airlines purchased planes in U.S. dollars even though its principal revenues
were in British pounds. Over time, a weakening pound increased the cost of its U.S. dollar
financing and also resulted in less British travel abroad. The resulting currency mismatch
forced Laker Airlines to file for bankruptcy in 1982. Charles W. Smithson, Managing
Financial Risk 7-8 (3d ed. 1998). The spike in oil prices during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict in
1990 also brought home to managers the risk of commodity price fluctuations.
Continuing with airline examples, Continental Airlines's fuel costs rose substantially
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and so managers began to search for alternatives to minimize or transfer
their new exposures.
The capital markets quickly responded. Financial intermediaries, including banks, broker-dealers, and insurance companies, saw an opportunity to profit from the creation and trading of new financial instruments
that responded to client demands to improve risk sharing. 6 7 Those instruments pooled and transferred discrete slices of financial risk from
corporate counterparties to those (in many instances, the financial intermediaries themselves) who, through diversification or otherwise, were
in a better position to manage them. 68 Over time, the growing demand
for those instruments resulted in greater liquidity, 69 in turn lowering
their cost 70 and expanding the scope of what risks could be transferred
through the capital markets. 7 1 Exchange-traded currency and oil price
derivatives, for example, overtook less liquid and more costly private induring the period to more than 180% of its pre-invasion levels, forcing it to file for Chapter
11 protection a little over four months after the invasion took place. Id. at 14-15. For the
moment, we will skip over the retort based upon the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance
propositions that shareholders can hedge things like oil price risk for their own account.
As discussed infra at notes 82-102 and accompanying text, risk management's success has
depended on its ability to increase firm value by managing risk at the corporate level.
67. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing 38
(1994) (attributing financial innovation to lower transaction costs and improved risk
sharing); Allen & Santomero, supra note 46, at 1479-80 (discussing risk management
through use of various instruments); James C. Van Home, Of Financial Innovations and
Excesses, 40 J. Fin. 621, 621-22 (1985) (noting that "financial innovations occur in
response to profit opportunities which, in turn, arise from inefficiencies in financial
intermediation and/or incompleteness in financial markets").
68. See Allen & Santomero, supra note 46, at 1479-80; Van Home, supra note 67, at
621-22.
69. The Black-Scholes options pricing formula provided a means to value options
based on their terms and factors affecting the market price and volatility of the underlying
asset. Consequently, even illiquid derivatives could be valued if there was a market for the
underlying asset. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637, 640-53 (1973). That pricing model quickly gained hold
among traders and risk managers, allowing instruments to be created and valued even
where there was no trading market for the derivative itself. See Peter L. Bernstein, Capital
Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modem Wall Street 227 (1992) (discussing popularity
of Black-Scholes model among traders); Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securities and
Corporate Governance, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733, 734-35 (2002) (discussing effect of BlackScholes model on derivatives market).
70. Myron S. Scholes, Global Financial Markets, Derivative Securities, and Systemic
Risks, 12J. Risk & Uncertainty 271, 272 (1996). For example, financial intermediaries in
the early 1980s typically earned an up-front fee for arranging a plain vanilla swap, plus a
spread as high as fifty basis points over the life of the transaction. Less than ten years later,
reflecting new entrants and increased competition in the swaps marketplace, the up-front
fee was dropped and spreads were reduced to five to ten basis points. Robert T. Daigler &
Donald Steelman, Interest Rate Swaps and Financial Institutions 8-9 (Nov. 1988)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://www.
fiu.edu/-daigierr/pdf/swaps.pdf.
71. See Allen & Gale, supra note 67, at 38; Culp, Structured Finance, supra note 47, at
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struments that were popularjust a few years earlier. 72 Greater liquidity in
the risk markets, and the introduction of new risk management technologies, 73 also permitted financial intermediaries to provide a growing array
solutions that were closely
of private, over-the-counter (OTC) hedging
74
tailored to their clients' specific risks.
Today, the spectrum of risk transfer instruments has expanded beyond financial and commodities futures to include now-standard interest
rate, currency, and credit derivatives. 75 Weather derivatives, such as
those underlying AU's insurance contract, 76 can be more finely sliced
into risks associated with temperatures in an identified region or group of
cities, levels of snowfall and frost, and even the occurrence of hurricanes. 77 Through "catastrophe bonds," investors can now take on risks as
diverse as earthquakes in Southeast Asia, flooding in Great Britain, and
72. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, for example, provided a liquid and
standardized alternative to the over-the-counter (OTC) market for foreign exchange
derivatives. See Banks, supra note 46, at 129; Smithson, supra note 66, at 18-19. The
Chicago Board Options Exchange did the same for options trading. See Robert C.
Merton, Continuous-Time Finance 330 (1990). Firms also began to hedge by issuing
hybrid instruments that combined traditional debt or equity with foreign exchange,
interest rate, and commodity hedging instruments. For example, Mexico's state-owned
petroleum company, PEMEX, issued petroleum-linked bonds in 1973. In the mid-1980s,
firms began issuing dual currency bonds, bonds with embedded foreign exchange options,
convertible/exchangeable floating-rate notes, and inverse floating-rate notes. Other firms
issued securities whose returns were tied to natural gas, petroleum, and other commodity
prices. Smithson, supra note 66, at 18-23, 320-30.
73. Dan Rosen, The Development of Risk Management Software, in Modern Risk
Management: A History 135, 136-37 (Sarah Jenkins & Tamsin Kennedy eds., 2003). In
July 1993, for example, the Group of Thirty (G-30) recommended that dealers use "valueat-risk" (VaR) measures to assess portfolio riskiness. Global Derivatives Study Group,
Group of Thirty, Derivatives: Practices and Principles 10-11 (1993). VaR is a measure of
the probability that the market value of an asset or a portfolio of assets is likely to decrease
over a period of time under usual conditions. See generally Olivier Scaillet, The Origin
and Development of Value-at-Risk, in Modern Risk Management, supra, at 151 (providing
brief overview of VaR). When the G-30 Report was issued, VaR was a specialized tool
known primarily to a closed universe of risk managers. It quickly became a standard of
both financial and non-financial firms, largely due to the efforts of J.P. Morgan-who
provided clients, for free, with detailed directions on how to implement VaR, as well as key
factors necessary to calculate VaR that were updated daily through the internet. Glyn A.
Holton, Value-at-Risk: Theory and Practice 18-19 (2003).
74. In general, OTC derivatives become less costly as public risk transfer markets
develop that allow financial intermediaries to diversify away their risks across a broader
array of counterparties. See Scholes, Futures, supra note 18, at 365.
75. A description of financial and commodities futures and interest rate, currency,
and credit swaps is included in Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 1, at 727-39.
76. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
77. The first Global Warming Index was launched in April 2007 as one means for
businesses to hedge against the effects of climate change on net income. Paul J. Davies,
Climate Change Gives Rise to Weather Hedge, Fin. Times (London), Apr. 24, 2007, at 38.
In addition to over-the-counter trading, weather derivatives can be purchased through an
auction market created by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). See CME, CME
Weather Products, at http://www.cme.com/trading/prd/weather/index.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2007) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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windstorms in Japan.7 8 At the cutting edge, economic derivatives permit
financial intermediaries to precisely hedge their exposures to a growing
array of macroeconomic risks, as evidenced by macroeconomic data releases-ranging from changes in U.S. employment rates to U.S. retail
sales, industrial production, consumer prices, and economic growth-on
79
which the value of those instruments is based.
Of course, in a frictionless world, if a firm chooses to transfer risk, we
would expect the premium it pays to mirror the risk-related costs the firm
would otherwise incur in raising capital-a zero-sum game, since the risk
would now be borne by the transferee's shareholders, who should demand the same returns as the transferor's shareholders. If the risk
counterparty, however, is better able to manage risk at lower costthrough increasingly complete capital markets that enable the transferee
to diversify its risks across a portfolio of companies-then, over time, we
would expect the premium to fall below the cost the transferor would
otherwise bear if the risk was retained.8 0 The implications are significant:
As markets develop for the transfer of risk, risk transfer instruments may
become a lower cost substitute for public equity, permitting managers to
supplement, and even replace, traditional capital and capital-related
8 1

costs.

B. The Real Benefits of Risk Management
Risk management poses the standard Miller-Modigliani agnosticism
concerning the claim that capital structure affects firm value: Absent frictions, capital structure-whether measured by debt and equity or expanded to include risk management instruments that may not appear on
the balance sheet-is irrelevant to firm value.8 2 Recent scholarship regarding the real costs of cash flow volatility, information asymmetries,
and other real world frictions, however, demonstrate that risk manage78. See Liam Pleven, Sailing Toward Ill Winds: Scientist Uses Biophysics to Chart
Catastrophes, Wall St. J., May 21, 2007, at CI (discussing growth in "catastrophe bond"
market).
79. For a description of economic derivatives, see Blaise Gadanecz, Richhild Moessner
& Christian Upper, Economic Derivatives, BIS Q. Rev., Mar. 2007, at 69, 70-71, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/ri.qt0703h.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
80. See Shimpi, supra note 40, at 29-37 (describing standard corporate finance and
insurance models of capital structure).
81. We note, as well, a similar relationship between capital and risk bearing in the
Basel II accord on capital adequacy by commercial banks, see Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 35
(2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review), which is likely to result in greater levels of risk management by banks and an
increased reliance on risk transfer instruments. See Ernst & Young, Basel II: The Business
Impact 3-4 (2006), available at http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/International/
Basel IILSurveyReport_2006/$file/EY_GFSRMBasel II Survey2006.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
82. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 261-71 (1958).
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ment may generate benefits (which we summarize below 8 3 ) that enhance
8 4
firm value in ways that shareholders cannot duplicate for themselves.
For our purposes, these benefits drive the demand that has led to growth
in capital markets completeness and, in turn, provide the potential that is
our concern in this Essay-the replacement of common stock held by
to
diversified investors as an "'all purpose' risk cushion" 85 by transferring
86
the market the discrete slices that make up systematic risk.
Shareholder costs to monitor portfolio risk are reflected in a firm's
cost of capital. Managers, however, have less costly access to confidential
information, giving them an edge over shareholders in assessing and
managing risk. 8 7 Doing so may reduce earnings "noise" (the impact on
earnings of factors outside management control) and so improve the
quality of publicly available information regarding management capability and firm value. 8 8 To that extent, corporate hedging may enhance the
shareholders' ability to manage portfolio risk, reducing their expected
returns on equity and, in turn, the firm's cost of capital. 89
83. See infra notes 87-102 and accompanying text.
84. MacKay and Moeller demonstrate, for example, that for a sample of thirty-four oil
refiners, the real benefits of corporate risk management can enhance firm value by an
estimated two to three percent. Peter MacKay & Sara B. Moeller, The Value of Corporate
Risk Management, 62J. Fin. 1379, 1411-15 & tbl.8 (2007). Carter, Rogers, and Simkins
have also found a positive relationship within the airline industry between the hedging of
jet fuel and firm value, with an average hedging premium of five to ten percent. David A.
Carter, Daniel A. Rogers & Betty J. Simkins, Does Hedging Affect Firm Value? Evidence
from the US Airline Industry, Fin. Mgmt., Spring 2006, at 53, 73-74.
85. Scholes, Derivatives, supra note 16, at 366.
86. Shareholders can virtually eliminate unsystematic risk through portfolio
diversification but will nevertheless remain exposed to systematic risk. Brealey, Myers &
Allen, supra note 1, at 162 & nn.26-27. Systematic risk, however, can be transferred by the
firm to the marketplace, rather than being borne by public shareholders. Consequently,
over time, we would expect equity to become subject to greater unsystematic risk consistent
with primary ownership by management. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
87. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, A Senior Manager's Guide to Integrated Risk
Management, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Winter 2002, at 56, 58.
88. See Peter M. DeMarzo & Darrell Duffle, Corporate Incentives for Hedging and
Hedge Accounting, 8 Rev. Fin. Stud. 743, 744-45 (1995).
89. See Christopher Grczy, Bernadette A. Minton & Catherine Schrand, Why Firms
Use Currency Derivatives, 52J. Fin. 1323, 1328-30 (1997) [hereinafter G~czy, Minton &
Schrand, Why Firms]. A firm's costs may be further reduced to the extent that hedging
lowers the risk premium it must pay managers whose wealth is largely invested in their
employer (for example, through stock awards, options, and bonuses tied to company
earnings). See Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation:
Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options, Fin. Mgmt., Summer
2001, at 5, 35 (2001); Clifford W. Smith & Ren6 M. Stulz, The Determinants of Firms'
Hedging Policies, 20 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 391, 399-402 (1985). It may also
weaken the potential for conflict faced by managers whose compensation is tied to firm
performance. Peter Tufano found, for example, that gold companies whose managers
held options on their employer's stock tended to manage less gold price risk (presumably
increasing share volatility and the value of their options). Firms whose managers held
more stock tended to more closely manage gold risk. Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk?
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A key feature of the claim that risk management increases firm value
is its ability to reduce cash flow volatility. Losses may be offset by payments received under derivatives, insurance, and other risk transfer instruments. By lowering volatility, firms may be able to free up capital they
would otherwise set aside against the risk of a future drop in revenues.90
Greater cash flow predictability filtered through a pecking order theory
of capital structure may, in turn, permit firms to make value-enhancing
investments using less costly internal funds, 9 1 rather than relying on external sources that bear the incremental costs associated with information
asymmetries. 92 If internal funding is unavailable or unreliable, then a
firm's ability to invest in new projects (including research and development) may be compromised; projects that appeared attractive may become less so due to the higher cost of funding, or may be abandoned
altogether, potentially resulting in a loss of value to the firm. 9 3 Consequently, reductions in cash flow volatility from hedging may enable a firm
to pursue greater growth opportunities,9 4 resulting over time in an in-

An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, 51

J. Fin. 1097, 1118-20 (1996).
90. See Nocco & Stulz, supra note 63, at 11-14. Recall, as well, the impact of AU's
insurance contract on its use of capital. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
91. See Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Risk Management:
Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies, 48 J. Fin. 1629, 1630-31
(1993); see also Geczy, Minton & Schrand, Why Firms, supra note 89, at 1323-33 (finding
evidence, among subset of Fortune 500 companies, supporting notion that "firms use
derivatives to reduce the variation in cash flows or earnings that might otherwise preclude
firms from investing in valuable growth opportunities"); Judy C. Lewent & A. John
Kearney, Identifying, Measuring, and Hedging Currency Risk at Merck, J. Applied Corp.
Fin., Winter 1990, at 19, 25-26 (noting that volatility in Merck's earnings, particularly
related to foreign exchange fluctuations, negatively affected its investment decisions);
Bernadette A. Minton & Catherine Schrand, The Impact of Cash Flow Volatility on
Discretionary Investment and the Costs of Debt and Equity Financing, 54J. Fin. Econ. 423,
438-40 (1999) [hereinafter Minton & Schrand, Impact] (finding that higher cash flow
volatility is associated with lower average levels of investment in capital expenditures, R&D,
and advertising).
92. See Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39J. Fin. 575, 589-90 (1984)
(describing how cost of capital is function of information asymmetries, with asymmetry
greatest with equity).
93. See Froot, Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 91, at 1630-31; David Mayers & Clifford
W. Smith,Jr., Corporate Insurance and the Underinvestment Problem, 54J. Risk & Ins. 45,
51-52 (1987).
94. See G6czy, Minton & Schrand, Why Firms, supra note 89, at 1323 (finding, among
subset of Fortune 500 companies, that "firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter
financial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives").
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crease in firm value 95 and, as those investments generate revenues, a reduced cost of future financing. 9 6
A firm may also be at less risk of incurring the real costs of financial
distress-such as bankruptcy costs, indirect costs from a decline in market competitiveness, and risk premiums demanded by customers, suppliers, and employees-as it improves its ability to manage risk. 97 By reducing the risk of financial distress, a firm may increase its debt capacity98
without requiring the corresponding increase in equity capital presumed
by the contractarian model 99 or the increase in the cost of debt predicted
by the Miller-Modigliani irrelevancy propositions. 10 0 Anticipating our argument in Part III, risk management may, in effect, act as a lower-cost
surrogate for equity capital, permitting a firm to then substitute debt for
equity in order to fund its working capital needs. 10 1
None of these real benefits can be duplicated by shareholders.
Value-maximizing managers, therefore, have an incentive to continue to
develop a supply of instruments necessary to support a growing risk transfer market. The growth of this market may, in turn, provide firms with
greater opportunities to transfer risk at lower cost-so that innovations in

95. See George Allayannis, Brian Rountree & James P. Weston, Earnings Volatility,
Cash Flow Volatility, and Firm Value 3, 26-27 (Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/seminars
calendar/Rountree.doc (finding one standard deviation increase in cash flow volatility
resulting in thirty to thirty-seven percent decrease in firm value).
96. See Minton & Schrand, Impact, supra note 91, at 449-55, 456 tbl.8 (finding that
cash flow volatility increases costs of accessing external capital).
97. Smith & Stulz, supra note 89, at 395-98.
98. See Walter Dolde, Hedging, Leverage, and Primitive Risk, 4 J. Fin. Engineering
187, 200-13 (1995) (finding significant positive relationship between hedging and
leverage among subset of Fortune 500 companies); G. David Haushalter, Financing Policy,
Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas Producers, 55J. Fin. 107,
146 (2000) (concluding that oil and gas companies with greater financial leverage manage
price risks more extensively).
99. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
100. Modigliani & Miller, supra note 82, at 267-71. For a concise summary of the
Miller-Modigliani propositions, see Robert C. Merton, In Honor of Nobel Laureate, Franco
Modigliani, 1 J. Econ. Persp. 145, 149-50 (1987).
101. Culp, Revolution, supra note 37, at 15-16; Stulz, supra note 39, at 16. In order to
enhance its debt capacity, a firm will need to credibly commit to lenders to continue to
manage risk after a loan is made, typically through contractual covenants. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 4, at 337-39; Modigliani & Miller, supra note 82, at 292-93; Clifford
W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond
Covenants, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 117, 119 (1979). More generally, the parties confront the
agency costs of debt. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 333-43. For this purpose,
the legal infrastructure necessary to implement agency cost reduction techniques include
contract law, effective private enforcement of contract rights, and bankruptcy law. See,
e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1121-26 & tbl.1 (1998)
(surveying legal rules protecting corporate shareholders and creditors).
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risk transfer are likely to continue, resulting in a virtuous cycle of further
0 2
declines in cost prompting further innovation.
In this Part, we have stressed the potential for new risk management
techniques to overcome the barrier of capital structure irrelevancy. That
potential, in turn, has provided the incentive for financial intermediaries
to develop the instruments and institutions that support more complete
capital markets-in which risk can be priced and sold by the slice, like
New York pizza, rather than in the aggregate through common stock. We
next consider the extent to which more complete capital markets may
result in significant changes in corporate ownership and governance.
III.

THE EVOLVING MODEL OF THE CORPORATION

Increasingly complete capital markets may begin to offer a less costly
means than public equity for firms to manage risk, with risk transfer instruments over time taking on the risk-bearing role of traditional equity.
By diversifying risk at the firm level, those instruments may also allow for
a greater concentration in equity ownership among owner-managers with
important consequences for the future of public corporations and corporate governance. 10 3 If risk management can begin to substitute for risk
capital, and if the risks of concentrated ownership can be diversified at
the firm level, then a central reason for an owner to take a company
public in the first place disappears and the agency costs of public equity
become increasingly optional.' 0 4 In effect, the traditional balance between agency costs and the benefits of public ownership may begin to
shift toward a new equilibrium, which we discuss below, 10 5 as firms assess
102. Merton has made a similar observation regarding financial intermediariesnamely, that new trading markets enhance their ability to create custom-designed financial
instruments, resulting in increased trading to hedge exposures and reduced transaction
costs, making possible the creation of new financial instruments, and so forth. Merton,
Financial Innovation, supra note 6, at 18-19; see also Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie,
Design of Financial Systems: Towards a Synthesis of Function and Structure, J. Investment
Mgmt., First Quarter 2005, at 6, 19-20 (referring to "financial innovation spiral").
103. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 333-34, 343-51 (suggesting that large
firms would rarely be privately owned in light of welfare loss to owner-managers whose
wealth would be tied up in single, undiversified investment).
104. By describing the increasing ability to manage risk at the firm level, we are not
suggesting that firms may not still benefit from investor diversification, even where those
risks traditionally borne by risk capital have been transferred out of the firm. Private equity
firms typically invest in a portfolio of companies, thereby diversifying their investors'
positions. See George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang & Stephen Prowse, The Private Equity
Market: An Overview, Fin. Markets Institutions & Instruments, no. 4, at 1, 47 (1997)
(describing private equity market and participants). For public companies with dispersed
equity, we would expect returns on capital provided by a diversified private equity fund to
continue to be related to systematic risk, since those firms will have chosen to retain
significant broad-based risk bearing through public equity. See generally Brealey, Myers &
Allen, supra note 1, at 188-91 (describing capital asset pricing model). As we describe in
this Essay, however, that risk may increasingly be transferred to the marketplace. See supra
notes 21, 86 and accompanying text.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 131-133.
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their ability to manage risk relative to the marketplace, retaining those
risks where they are at a competitive advantage and transferring the rest.
The realistic option of remaining private envisions a corporate structure that resembles the LBO association that Michael Jensen described
almost twenty years ago-with working capital funded primarily by debt,
and private equity ownership aligning management and shareholder incentives. 10 6 As discussed earlier, 10 7 the characteristic LBO target in the
1980s private equity wave about which Jensen wrote was a market leader
in a mature industry-a firm with low capital needs and high, consistent
cash flow-where debt could largely substitute for equity, thereby reducing equity levels. 10 8 The residual equity, held by the LBO firm and management, was reduced essentially to an incentive contract. In that setting,
the agency cost of equity was eliminated and the agency cost of debt was
addressed by contract, resulting in a corporate form that more efficiently
reduced agency costs than the public corporation. Jensen, like most
economists a good Darwinian, predicted the public corporation's
eclipse. 109
The intuition we address in this Essay is that more complete capital
markets, resulting from the demand for more efficient risk-bearing instruments, now make the governance structure Jensen extolled available
to a much wider range of companies. A company will use risk management instruments to transfer those risks that counterparties can manage
at lower cost" 0 and retain only those risks over which management has a
comparative advantage relative to the capital markets.111 Again, equity
approaches a management incentive contract. A riskier company that
would not have matched the 1980s private equity profile-due to significant systematic risk that made it unsuitable for debt to replace equity,
such as for an airline-can lay off that systematic risk slice by slice,
thereby supporting a far higher level of debt and, it follows, Jensen's
more efficient governance structure. Thus, companies for whom the
106. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 9, at 10-16.
107. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
108. See Tim Opler & Sheridan Titman, The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout
Activity: Free Cash Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs, 48 J. Fin. 1985, 1992-98 (1993)
(finding that, during LBO wave of 1980s, companies with high cash flow and unfavorable
investment opportunities were more likely to undertake a LBO, and companies with
higher financial distress costs were less likely); Brownwyn H. Hall, The Financing of
Research and Development 11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8773,
2002), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8773 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that firms with higher R&D "intensity" were less likely to do LBO, since
resulting reduced cash flows limited their ability to sustain R&D programs).
109. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 9, at 1, 9-13.
110. See Stulz, supra note 39, at 8.
111. Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 737-38; Scholes, Derivatives, supra note 16, at
367; see also Gillian Tett, The Appliance of Financial Science, Fin. Times, May 21, 2007, at
20 (describing interview with Merton, where he notes that most companies use capital
inefficiently by not retaining those risks where they have comparative advantage and
transferring rest).
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costs of an LBO in the 1980s would have been prohibitive may now manage and reduce those costs through the transfer of risk.' 12 Moreover, as a
borrower's systematic risk is reduced through risk management techniques, lenders may be willing to increase the size of their loans over
longer periods and so increase the size of companies that undertake an
LBO.' 13 As we will consider later in this Part, the story-that is, LBOs of
a wider range of companies and of a much larger size than the 1980s
preferred profile-at least superficially fits the most recent private equity
wave.

114

More complete capital markets may also affect the public corporation in another way. Private equity acts on corporations that are already
public. But what about the decision to go public in the first place? Here,
we suggest that risk management's ability to reduce systematic risk
through increasingly complete capital markets provides an alternative to
an initial public offering (IPO), both of which respond to an owner's
need to secure liquidity to diversify her own portfolio. Some historical
evidence supports this conjecture. Tradable derivatives were developed
quite early for agricultural products to facilitate risk management by
farmers and by companies for which farm commodities were a central
input.1 15 The hypothesis-that private ownership should be more likely
among large businesses for which the price and availability of commodities are a central determinant of profitability-appears to have been the
case in the agricultural market. For those companies, the capital markets
were complete at a much earlier time. 1 16
112. For example, following the announcement that Sallie Mae would be acquired by
two private equity firms, there was concern that a resulting drop in credit rating would
prohibitively increase its cost of funding loans. That fear was largely offset by Sallie Mae's
ability to reduce risk and raise funds through ongoing loan securitizations. Gregory
Zuckerman, Has Sallie Deal Put Banks in Play for Private Equity?, Wall St.J., Apr. 18, 2007,
at Cl.
113. We note that, while our focus here is on corporate borrowers, lenders may (and,
indeed, often do) take advantage of the capital markets innovations that we describe in this
Essay to diversify their own risk. See, e.g., TonyJackson, The Wonders of Life in the RearView Mirror, Fin. Times (London), Mar. 12, 2007, at 20 ("[Private equity funds] take out
highly leveraged loans [to fund their purchases]. The issuing banks then hand those to
the investment banks, which package them up into derivatives and add vastly more
leverage in the process."); John Plender, Markets Versus the Conventional Wisdom in
2007, Fin. Times (London), Jan. 2, 2007, at 16 (noting relationship between growth in
credit derivatives market and private equity investment).
114. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West
97-147 (1991) (describing development of U.S. grain market in 19th century).
116. Key to the creation of a futures market, through which businesses may hedge
exposure to commodities prices, was the creation of an instrument to inexpensively
transfer title to commodities and a standard system of grading those commodities. Both
existed in the United States by the mid-1800s, resulting in the launch of one of the largest
futures exchanges in the world, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). See Randall S.
Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk?, 31 J. Money Credit &
Banking 596, 598-99 (1999). Even before creation of the CBOT, however, an active
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To this point, we have told a fairly straightforward story. Increasingly
complete capital markets, developed in response to the demand for risk
management techniques that could increase firm value, also turn out to
change the most efficient way to manage the agency costs of public investment. The ability to lay off systematic risk by the slice rather than
through the broadband risk bearing of common stock allows a wider
range of public companies to be the subject of an LBO and, we believe,
has the potential to permit a broader range of companies to remain private. In short, the story is one in which changes in financial technology
1 17
change the border between public and private companies.
Even in our story, however, a looming question remains: What is the
new border between public and private ownership? The recent private
equity wave witnessed an enormous shift away from public ownership
and, we may suppose, also a shift in the balance that dictates an owner's
decision to go public in the first place. Are we now, twenty years after the
specter was first raised, seeing the eclipse of the public corporation?
At this stage, we are willing to make a bet on what the near future
holds-like, but rather more pedestrian than, Stephen Hawking's wager
on whether information ever escapes from a black hole.' 1 " From our perspective, the increasing ability to shift risk by the slice moves the border
toward privatization, but still leaves significant room for a vigorous public
market. In fact, we may be seeing the early stages of this move as large
going private transactions and the creation of new trading markets have
started to refashion public companies into "private-ish or public-esque
hybrids of their former selves" that include both private equity and quasi-

commodities forward market existed in New York City and Buffalo, New York, as a means
for producers and merchants to lock in future delivery prices. See Jeffrey C. Williams, The
Origin of Futures Markets, 56 Agric. Hist. 306, 309-16 (1982).
117. This transaction cost theory of the ownership structure of the firm also finds
support in current changes in the boundary of the firm that divides those activities that are
undertaken within the firm and those whose output are acquired across a market. The
increasing vertical disintegration of the supply chain in technology industries reflects the
same kind of reallocation of activities as we have described with respect to risk
management. Where competitive success requires cutting-edge technology across a
number of areas, it is increasingly difficult for a single company to maintain superiority
across all areas. The result has been an increasing reliance on codevelopment contracts,
joint ventures, and acquisitions to accomplish tasks that previously had been done
internally. For a useful evaluation of competing explanations for the phenomenon of
supply chain vertical disintegration and their relation to a theory of the firm, see Charles F.
Sabel & Jonathan Zeitin, Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-Firm
Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 Enterprise & Soc'y 388, 390-401 (2004) (U.K.).
118. Hawking conceded his famous bet with John Preskill in July 2004 by presenting
him with a baseball encyclopedia from which information (at least about baseball) could
'escape." Dennis Overbye, About Those Fearsome Black Holes? Never Mind, N.Y. Times,
July 22, 2004, at Al.

HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 254 2008

2008]

DECONSTRUCTING EQUITY

public shareholders.1 19 Yet, for the time being, the public market provides benefits that are not available through other means. Our bet is that
we will see a shift away from public ownership at the margin, but until
those benefits can be provided by other institutions, public ownership will
continue to play a meaningful role in the capital markets. The trickboth in predicting where public ownership will remain strongest and
where to invest in the innovation that will displace it-is in understanding the continuing benefits, beyond facilitating risk bearing, that the dispersed ownership of equity provides.
Consider at the outset whether to go public in the first place. The
decision to go public turns on more than issues of risk transfer and
agency costs. For some firms, the benefits of going public, when balanced against the associated costs, 120 may still favor the public equity mar12 1
kets even in the face of alternative means to transfer risk.
At the shareholder level, going public permits a firm's equity owners
to diversify their exposure to a single venture1 22 and provides greater 1i119. Dennis K. Berman, Latest Trend in Big Buyouts: Blend of Public, Private Traits,
Wall St. J., May 22, 2007, at C1.
120. The costs of going public include underwriting and related transaction costs,
underpricing costs (including those arising from information asymmetries), and the
ongoing costs of public reporting, including the disclosure of sensitive or proprietary
information. See, e.g., Thomas J. Chemmanur & Paolo Fulghieri, A Theory of the GoingPublic Decision, 12 Rev. Fin. Stud. 249, 251 (1999) (analyzing differences in informationrelated costs of public and private firms); Jay R. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. Fin.
Econ. 269, 269-76 (1987) (describing direct expenses of going public); Kevin Rock, Why
New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 187, 205-07 (1986) (concluding that new
issues are underpriced in order to guarantee that uninformed investors purchase); Oved
Yosha, Information Disclosure Costs and the Choice of Financing Source, 4 J. Fin.
Intermediation 3, 16 (1995) (finding that higher quality firms are likely to prefer bilateral
over multilateral financing in order to avoid public disclosure of private information);
Sreedhar T. Bharath & Amy K. Dittmar, To Be or Not to Be (Public) 8-14 (Dec. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=951710 (describing costs and benefits of being public firm). The costs
of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley have also figured prominently in the stated reasons for
why some companies go private. In addition to regulatory risk, one report estimates that
the average cost of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance by a public company with annual revenues
of at least $1 billion was $14.3 million in 2004, an increase of $4.4 million over 2003.
Thomas E. Hartman, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley 1 (2005),
available at http://www.financialexecutives.org/download/foley 6_16_2005.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
121. Thus, Bharath and Dittmar test various cost-benefit theories of why firms go
public, suggesting that a change in the relative tradeoffs that favor a decision to go public
should drive a public firm's later decision to go private. Bharath & Dittmar, supra note
120, at 30-31.
122. See Marco Pagano, The Flotation of Companies on the Stock Market: A
Coordination Failure Model, 37 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1101, 1103 (1993) (noting that IPO opens
up new risk-sharing opportunities for other investors); Salman Shah & Anjan V. Thakor,
Private Versus Public Ownership: Investment, Ownership Distribution, and Optimality, 43
J. Fin. 41, 57-58 (1988) (finding that decision to go public reflects balance between costs
of capital markets screening and benefits of improved risk sharing).
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quidity by lowering the transaction cost of selling shares. 12 3 In addition,
an IPO creates a currency for use in later acquisitions, which may provide
an advantage over cash-financed deals. 124 Risk management can substitute for the risk diversification offered by the public markets, but it fails
to provide the liquidity an owner or prospective owner will need to sell
her shares for other reasons.
At the corporate level, the informational efficiency of public company share prices provides an important management tool-a company
receives virtually instant feedback through prices and periodic feedback
through analyst reports, concerning its strategy and performance and
that of its competitors, which would not be available to a private company. Consequently, public equity facilitates incentive compensation to
attract and retain talented managers and employees. By providing an unbiased assessment of management performance, a public market facilitates the design of an incentive structure that can minimize agency costs.
Even talented owners and managers benefit from additional performance
assessments that are not perfectly correlated with their own. 1 25
The public markets also offer an antidote to the distortion that results from managers viewing the need for change through the semiopaque walls of the corporation. Absent public scrutiny of a company's
strategy and the state of its industry, owner-managers may be more at risk
of failing to respond to changes in their business environment or selecting suboptimal projects that erode firm value. 12 6 Thus, in industries
where the ability to rapidly respond to change provides a competitive advantage, the benefits of being a public company may, in the end, out127
weigh the reductions in cost from private ownership.
Ironically, the informational efficiency of a public market is-like
the ability to substitute risk management for risk capital-a function of
123. See Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta & Luigi Zingales, Why Do Companies Go
Public? An Empirical Analysis, 53J. Fin. 27, 39-40 (1998).
124. See James C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of
Theory and Practice, 61 J. Fin. 399, 406-07 & tbl.2, 424-25 (2006) (finding, based on
survey of CFOs, that most important motivation to go public is to create public shares for
future acquisitions).
125. See Bengt Holmstr6m & Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Performance
Monitoring, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 678, 707 (1993) (finding that stock prices assist in
determining compensation, since they include objective market assessments of
performance). The informational content of share prices may also include "serendipitous"
information that public investors chance upon over the course of their day-to-day activities
that is not known to corporate insiders. Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Sheridan Titman,
The Going-Public Decision and the Development of Financial Markets, 54 J. Fin. 1045,
1047 (1999).
126. See Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 9, at 9 (noting that large cash balances allow
managers to fund projects without constraint of capital markets); Peter Tufano, Agency
Costs of Corporate Risk Management, 27 Fin. Mgmt. 67, 73-74 (1998) (giving examples of
"risk management programs... explicitly designed to protect manager's 'pet projects'").
127. See Scholes, Futures, supra note 18, at 364-65 (summarizing cost-benefit
analysis).
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increasing capital markets completeness. Share prices have become
more informative over the last fifty years, in part reflecting the increase in
firm-specific disclosure over the period. Stock market signals, therefore,
may be an increasingly effective means to gauge how well management is
1 28
performing.
Finally, the benefits of going public include the prestige (perhaps
diminishing) and credibility of being a public company, as well as the
publicity associated with the decision to go public and the firm's continuing public disclosures. 129 In addition, lenders may be more willing to
extend less expensive loans to a firm that is subject to ongoing market
evaluation, is obligated by the securities law to make periodic disclosures,
130
or negotiates more aggressively in light of its other funding sources.
A firm's decision to remain private, then, is by no means inevitable,
but it is increasingly feasible as public shareholders yield their status as
least costly risk bearers, the agency costs of public equity therefore become optional, and the benefits of diversification become available
through alternative risk-bearing instruments. Where the balance ends
up-whether we have made a good bet-will depend on two things. The
first is the ability of the capital markets to provide liquidity to shareholders for needs other than diversification. On this front, as proved to be
the case with risk management, we expect that if the demand appears,
the capital markets will devise the instruments and institutions necessary
to meet it. The second is the importance of the capital markets in providing information that is instrumental to managing a company's strategy.
The ability to respond quickly to change is becoming more important as
globalization and improved technology, among other forces, increase the
rate of change in many industries.13 1 If public market information enhances a company's competitiveness, survivorship will favor companies
that have gone public. Again, we imagine this influence will operate on
128. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 1541-63. A firm's share price is more informed to
the extent it reflects a greater amount of information that is reasonably knowable about
the firm. Merritt B. Fox, Measuring Share Price Accuracy, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 113, 120
(2004).
129. See Elizabeth Demers & Katharina Lewellen, The Marketing Role of IPOs:
Evidence from Internet Stocks, 68 J. Fin. Econ. 413, 414-16, 431-35 (2003) (providing
evidence that underpricing IPO may result in greater media attention for issuer); Neal M.
Stoughton, Kit Pong Wong &Josef Zechner, IPOs and Product Quality, 74J. Bus. 375, 377,
379-81 (2001) (suggesting that consumers may discern product quality from stock price).
130. See Pagano, Panetta & Zingales, supra note 123, at 53-56; see also Raghuram G.
Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt, 47
J. Fin. 1367, 1392 (1992) (arguing that firm's borrowing from multiple sources may
circumscribe single bank's ability to extract surplus).
131. See Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree 19-27 (2000)
(describing erosion of boundaries between politics, culture, technology, finance, national
security, and ecology); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. Fin. 831, 840-47 (1993) (listing reasons for
systematic overcapacity problems in various industries).
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the margin; there are many highly successful private companies, such as
132
Koch Industries and BMW.
The implication, however, is that the traditional balance between
agency costs and the benefits of public ownership may begin to shift toward a new equilibrium as firms assess their ability to manage risk relative
to the marketplace, retaining those risks where they are at a competitive
advantage and transferring the rest. In more complete capital markets,
firms can accept or reject the agency costs of public ownership, choosing
instead to manage risk using alternative risk transfer instruments; working capital can be funded with debt. A firm's decision to go (or remain)
public, therefore, may increasingly be less a function of the need to raise
risk capital or diversify risk, as in the traditional construct, and more a
balance between the incremental costs of going public (compared to a
reliance on risk transfer instruments) and the incremental benefits of being a public company (beyond the receipt of broadband risk capital).
What will be the impact of private equity funds-LBO associations in
Jensen's 1980s terminology-on the future of public ownership? The recent LBO wave has been both broader and deeper than the 1980s wave,
with larger and more diverse companies being acquired by private equity
funds. 133 Has the increasing completeness of the capital markets eliminated the barrier that prevented the eclipse of the public corporation
when it was first predicted?
We think not, or at least not yet. Most important, the structure of
the private equity market now, as in the 1980s, requires a liquidity event
(such as an IPO or a sale of the acquired business) within the usual tenyear life of the private equity fund in order to return capital to investors. 134 In the absence of taking the portfolio company public again,
132. See generally Koch Industries, Inc., at http://www.kochind.com (last visited Nov.
5, 2007) (providing company overview and financial information); BMW Group, at http://
www.bmwgroup.com (last visited Nov.5, 2007) (same).
133. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
134. The notion of a fixed timeline to measure a general partner's performance and
providing investors the option to reinvest their funds with the general partner is central to
the incentive structure of a private equity fund and a source of the claim for lower agency
costs than in the case of public ownership. See Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 9, at 18. The
same structure is found in venture capital funds. See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The
Venture Capital Cycle 171-200 (2004); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital
Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067, 1089-90 (2003)
[hereinafter Gilson, Engineering]. Without a fixed life, the structure becomes, in effect, a
closed-end investment fund, with the increased agency costs associated with that structure.
See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted"
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891, 902-05 (1988) (describing
agency costs of closed-end funds). In 2006, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Apollo sold
private equity funds to the public, without a mandatory term, which they listed on
Euronext Amsterdam. See James Anderson & Adrian Deitz, Seeking a Wider Public:
Ironically for Some, New Private Equity Funds Are Submitting to the Rigours of the Public
Capital Markets, 25 Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 44, 44-45 (2006).
In contrast, rather than selling interests in a particular fund that the firm advises,
Blackstone's public offering was of common units that indirectly benefit from its operating
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from where does the private equity fund secure liquidity? One might sell
the portfolio company to another company in its industry. For venture
capital funds, there are cycles in which a sale is preferred to a public
offering as a liquidity event. 1 35 However, venture capital portfolio companies are typically much smaller than the companies being taken private
in the most recent LBO wave. For these larger companies, there may be
barriers to an acquisition-funded liquidity event.
In recent years, another form of liquidity event has arisen: the sale
of a portfolio company by one private equity fund to another. 13 6 The
puzzle is the underlying logic of this pattern. One source of value creation from an LBO is what Steven Kaplan has called "shock-therapy"-the
quick fix of operating and investment problems at the acquired company.' 37 If that is the primary value of an LBO, then what value is added
by the second, post-shock therapy private equity fund, and from what
source will the returns to its investors come?
A second source of value from the purchase of the portfolio company by a second private equity fund has more promise, but also promises
lower returns. A private equity fund simply may provide better governentities. But are common units the same as common stock? Investors in Blackstone's
offering own units in a holding partnership that, through wholly-owned subsidiaries, acts as
the general partner of and owns equity interests in five other partnerships that, in turn
(with limited exception), own Blackstone's operating entities. See The Blackstone Group
L.P., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1 Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of
1933 (Form S-1), at 4, 16 (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1393818/000104746907005100/a2178442zs-la.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Blackstone Registration Statement] (describing organizational
structure following initial public offering). Voting rights and control are contractually
limited, as are fiduciary and other duties running to the common unitholders, potentially
resulting in substantial agency costs. See infra note 140. Not surprisingly, a substantial
amount of interest in the primary offering came from speculators and those who could not
otherwise buy the underlying portfolio directly on more attractive terms. Joe Bel Bruno,
Blackstone IPO Still on Track, SFGate, June 21, 2007, at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/
(on file
article.cgi?f=/N/a/2007/06/21/financial/fO064319D37.DTL&feed=rss.business
with the Columbia Law Review); Michael Flaherty & Lilla Zuill, Blackstone Raises $4.1
Billion, Reuters, June 22, 2007, at http://www.reuters.com/article/innovationNews/
idUSN2136246820070622?page%20Number=1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
135. Gilson, Engineering, supra note 134, at 1075.
136. See William R. Parish, Jr. & Jonathan S. Ayre, Private Equity M&A: The Force
Behind the Seller's Market, Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Feb. 2007, at 10 (noting
"substantial increase in the percentage of total M&A volume involving private equity buyers
and sellers"). That trend may grow as the pipeline for new deals becomes increasingly
crowded-suggesting the possibility that the theoretical basis for remaining private
described in this Essay may, in a short while, become a practical necessity for some
companies. See Edward Chancellor et al., Private Equity's Buying Spree May Clog up the
Exit Doors Later, Wall St. J. Online, Jan. 5, 2007, at http://online.wsj.com/articleprint/
SB116794658482867468.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that, in 2006,
global IPO market was $200 billion, whereas roughly $2 trillion in private equity
transactions may go public in next few years).
137. Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts, J. Applied Corp.
Fin., Spring 1993, at 15, 24.
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ance-that is, a more cost effective reduction of agency costs-than is
possible in a public corporation. From this perspective, even the best
part-time independent directors are not the equivalent of full-time,
highly incentivized private equity managers. Thus, the portfolio company
is worth more in the hands of a private equity fund than with diversified
public ownership. After shock therapy is completed, the first fund will
sell to a second fund because the first fund requires liquidity and because
the company is worth more in private hands. The second fund will earn
less than the first-the difference being the return on shock therapybut will still earn more than investors in public companies due to the
1 38
superior governance structure it provides.
This analysis leads to an interesting speculation. If the benefit of the
second private equity fund is the reduced agency costs resulting from the
quasi-public ownership of a limited partnership with outside investors,
then would fully private ownership provide an even better governance
structure? We are then back to the question, why go public in the first
place?; or in the context of our example, why not sell the company to its
managers with the addition of debt supported by risk transfer instruments entered into by the company or its lenders? Given transaction
costs, would private ownership be more efficient than the serial monogamy of successive sales to private equity firms? To be sure, even private
owners have liquidity needs, 139 but they are certainly of lesser magnitude
than the need to reduce to cash the entire value of the corporation every
ten years. To reframe Jensen's provocative question of twenty years ago,
1 40
can we foresee the eclipse of the quasi-public corporation?
138. There are other possible explanations for exit sales occurring between private
equity funds. The first is specialization-different private equity funds may have different
skill sets. For example, a company with multiple problems may be acquired initially by a
private equity fund with particular financial engineering skills-getting the balance sheet
in place and stopping the worst sources of cash drains-but without specialized skills in
solving the company's operational problems. In this situation, the sale by the financiallyoriented private equity fund to an operationally-oriented fund may be just a process of
specialized sequential problem solving. A less general explanation focuses on timing. A
private equity fund may not have completed the "shock therapy" of a portfolio company
acquired later in the fund's term by the time a liquidity event is necessary. Here the sale to
a new private equity fund operates essentially as a substitution of one problem solver for
another, driven primarily by different time horizons. Finally, the second private equity
fund actually may be making the acquisition for the wrong reasons: to get investors' capital
placed to protect the fund advisor's management fee. Our point in this Essay is not yet to
choose among the explanations-all of which may be operative in one case or anotherbut to stress the governance explanation, which has not received very much attention in
the debate.
139. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
140. Blackstone's public offering, see supra note 134, provides an interesting
counterpoint to the argument framed in the text. If sophisticated management reduces
the benefit of going public, why did one of the most sophisticated risk managers, whose
business is taking public companies private, take itself public? We suggest that one reason
may lie in the structure of the IPO itself-providing Blackstone with access to "permanent
capital," Francesco Guerrera & James Politi, Reason to Believe? What May Underlie
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To this point in our assessment of how different ownership structures reduce agency costs, we have ignored the potential for those costs to
arise in connection with the risk transfer instruments that support the
transformation of common stock from an all-purpose risk bearer to an
incentive contract. Will owner-managers alter the company's business
strategy to the detriment of the risk counterparties? The Black-Scholes
option pricing model assumes that when the parties are shifting risks
whose probability distribution cannot be influenced by either side, the
transfer is a fair game. However, if one of the parties can influence the
probability distribution ex post, the game is no longer fair. Put more
concretely, suppose a manager-owned airline has transferred 100% of its
exposure to oil prices to a counterparty. Will the airline then have the
same incentive to reduce the risk of oil price increases through changes
1 41
in its operations?
Blackstone's New-Found Faith in Public Markets, Fin. Times (London), Mar. 21, 2007, at
15, with little or no common unitholder oversight over management decisions, and the
reduction or elimination of duties (including fiduciary duties) running from the general
partner and its affiliates to the unitholders. See Blackstone Registration Statement, supra
note 134, at 18, 53-58 (discussing investor risks related to Blackstone's organizational
structure); Dennis K. Berman, Henny Sender & Gregory Zuckerman, Blackstone Aims to
Keep Control as Public Entity, Wall St. J., March 23, 2007, at Al ("Blackstone made clear
that public shareholders will have little, if any, say in its decisions."). The result is liquidity
for Blackstone's owners at relatively low cost to them, but potentially resulting in
substantial agency costs being borne by the unitholders. See supra note 134 for a
discussion of agency costs. Michael Jensen has made a similar point, arguing that a
growing ability to rely on publicly-sourced capital-rather than being subject to the rigors
of a process that requires private equity managers to perform and return capital over a
finite horizon and then raise new funds-may begin to destroy the incentives that have
made private equity so successful. See Gretchen Morgenson, It's Just a Matter of Equity,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2007, § 3, at 1.
A demand for liquidity for nondiversification purposes may provide another part of
the answer. Blackstone's founding generation built substantial brand value through its
leadership. The need to successfully navigate the transfer of generations-can Blackstone
monetize its current brand value and, with permanent capital, become Goldman Sachs?may have cut in favor of a public offering. SeeJenny Anderson, The Logic and the Timing
of Taking Blackstone Public, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 2007, at C6 (explaining Blackstone's
going public makes sense because "at the end of it, everyone will know what he or she is
worth, including the founder, who may someday want to do other things"). Likewise, by
raising permanent capital, private equity firms may begin to build institutional capabilities
beyond the individual talents of a small group of bankers or traders, see Farrell et al., supra
note 11, at 154; however, as discussed earlier in this note, permanent capital will dilute a
central feature of the efficiency of private equity governance.
Finally, the prospect of overcrowding among new deals entering the marketplace may
have also prompted a public offering of a basket of investments. See supra note 136. Of
course, the offering may have also simply reflected a belief that the private equity industry
has peaked and the public markets would overvalue the business or units being sold.
141. For airlines, managing jet fuel costs can have a direct effect on firm value, thus
providing managers with an incentive to minimize those costs. See Carter, Rogers &
Simkins, supra note 84, at 79. Southwest Airlines recently announced that its fuel costs
would be substantially higher in 2007, despite having successfully hedged some ninety
percent of its exposure. See David Bond, Twilight of Hedging: Southwest's Fuel-Price
Strategy, Bulwark of Profits, Is Running out of Steam, Aviation Wk. & Space Tech., May 21,
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At present, the response to this agency cost problem has been to
define the transferred risks by reference to measures beyond the transferor's ability to influence, in order to minimize the potential for moral
hazard. In the case of AU's insurance policy, for example, the risk was
defined by reference to an industry measure over which AU had little
influence. Doing so limited AU's managers' capacity to adjust AU's behavior to manipulate the measure.' 4 2 The result, however, was a mismatch-between an optimal transfer of those risks where the firm was
competitively disadvantaged and a second-best solution where a portion
of that risk remained with the firm-that reflected the residual agency
143
costs that remained.
The deconstruction of equity is still too preliminary for the shape of
the responses to moral hazard in risk transfer to have taken shape. AU
illustrates one approach-reduce the possibility of hidden action by making the measure both transparent and outside the risk transferor's control. The cost was basis risk, a partial mismatch between the underlying
risk and its contractual measure. Butjust as the demand for instruments
that allowed risk to be transferred by the slice led to innovation on the
supply side that made the capital markets more complete, so too will the
demand for techniques that constrain agency costs associated with risk
14 4
transfer give rise to responsive structural and contractual innovations.
The landscape of corporate ownership-the distribution of public, quasipublic, and private ownership across different industries-at any given
time depends on the comparative capacity to reduce agency costs in each
ownership arrangement.

2007, at 29, 30; John Hughes, Fuel Bill Still 'Painful' at Southwest Airlines, Int'l Herald
Trib.,June 15, 2007, at 17. Since not all efforts to directly manage fuel costs are successful,
managers in the ordinary course would be expected to find other operational means to
minimize their risk of oil price increases. Froot, Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 91, at
1642-45, also describe how operational decisions like plant location can serve to manage
risk.
142. See supra note 35. More generally, this approach still leaves managers with an
incentive to reduce the company's exposure to the risk being hedged since the cost of the
hedge is directly related to the size of the risk being transferred to the market as opposed
to being managed internally.
143. We referred to this mismatch as "basis risk" when we described the AU insurance
contract earlier. See supra text accompanying note 35.
144. To pose an interesting speculation, traditional corporate governance posits that
directors owe a duty to maximize value for the long-term benefit of their common
shareholders rather than for other investors on the right side of the corporation's balance
sheet. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 & n.7 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting
that directors owe no fiduciary duty to bondholders). Where a company is closely held
(here because of its ability to enter into risk transfer transactions), are there barriers to
contractually limiting fiduciary duties to facilitate risk transfers? See Partnoy, supra note
24, at 801-26, for some initial answers (surveying implications of financial innovation for
management's fiduciary duties).
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CONCLUSION

In this Essay, we have argued that the premise that public shareholders are the cheapest risk bearers, which forms the foundation for the focus of modern corporate governance on agency costs, may no longer be
accurate. Changes in the capital markets have led to new risk management techniques and instruments, which enable firms and private owners
to transfer risk in discrete slices. Risk management at the firm level,
therefore, may be more efficient than risk bearing by diversified shareholders, providing real benefits that shareholders cannot duplicate for
themselves. These innovations suggest that equity as a broadband risk
bearer may no longer be a standard feature of the large corporation, and
so the agency costs associated with that structure may also become voluntary. If so, then the traditional balance between agency costs and the
benefits of public ownership may begin to shift lurchingly toward a new
equilibrium,1 4 5 for the time being reflecting a balance between the incremental costs of going public (compared to a reliance on risk transfer instruments) and the incremental benefits of being a public company (beyond the receipt of broadband risk capital) -a balance that was decidedly
second-order in the traditional analysis.
We also considered the extent to which the recent private equity
wave, both broader and deeper than that of the 1980s, ultimately may be
a precursor of change in the traditional construct of the corporationraising again the possibility of the eclipse of the public corporation, but
with more complete capital markets now making the LBO structure anticipated by Michael Jensen available to (and sustainable by) a much wider
range of companies. In doing so, we distinguished between private ownership and what we have called the quasi-public ownership of large corporations by a series of private equity funds-an ownership pattern of serial
monogamy driven by the institutional structure 5.nd liquidity needs of private equity funds.
Our goal has been to be provocative-to view a snapshot of today's
corporate ownership landscape through the prism of more complete capital markets, as a means to think about where it is all going. As with any
effort of this sort, continued capital markets innovation may cause our
predictions to be wrong. However, we have accomplished our goal if our
account successfully frames the issues that corporate planners and financial intermediaries must confront going forward.
An appropriate place to conclude is with what we have not considered. A shift to private ownership or even quasi-public ownership, fueled
by discrete as opposed to broadband risk transfer, will return capital to
current investors in public equity. But that capital still will be necessary
to fund future risk transfers of the character that gave rise to its return,
and the investors still will need a destination for that capital. We have not
considered here the institutional structure and financial instruments by
145. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22, 131-133.

HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 263 2008

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:231

which investors then will invest their capital in the market for risk transfer. We expect that the deconstruction of equity on the supply side that
we have considered here will be mirrored on the demand side by a
deconstruction of investment instruments. Institutions and the public
may then build portfolios by investing in slices of different risks offered
by intermediaries just as they now do in common stock, 146 but speculating on the shape of those arrangements is a project for another day.

146. For example, Fermat Capital Management LLC, a money manager based in
Westport, Connecticut, invests about ninety percent of its assets in catastrophe bonds
(commonly referred to as "cat bonds"), whose values are linked to the occurrence of
earthquakes, hurricanes, and other natural disasters. Cat bonds are issued by insurers as
one means to transfer their risk exposures on outstanding policies. For Fermat's clients,
these bonds offer one means to diversify their portfolios beyond traditional investments.
See Pleven, supra note 78, at C1.
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